When she started her work, the final understanding was that South American international locations had not reformed their police forces throughout their transitions to democracy as a result of there was a lot else that wanted to be executed. In that model of the story, fixing the police simply hadn’t been a precedence.
But when she dug somewhat deeper, she discovered that there really was quite a lot of public demand for higher safety and crime management, and infrequently quite a lot of anger in communities affected by police violence. The police hadn’t been neglected: They had been protected.
The police had been politically highly effective as a result of they might selectively withdraw their companies, permitting crime and dysfunction to rise, upsetting anger at elected officers. They additionally tended to be nicely linked, capable of foyer successfully to guard their very own pursuits. That meant battle with the police was expensive for politicians, who tended to keep away from it, leaving police departments and practices largely unaltered.
But there was a selected, tough to attain set of circumstances that, if met, would result in police reform, Gonzalez discovered. Briefly summarized, her formulation was this: scandal + public unity + credible political opposition = reform.
The sequence began with a scandal or disaster that led public opinion to unite a majority of individuals in favor of reform, she wrote in her book “Authoritarian Police in Democracy.” If there was additionally an actual electoral risk from political opponents calling for reform, that could possibly be sufficient to influence leaders to behave with the intention to stave off their competitors.
In Argentina and Colombia, that sequence led to main reforms after high-profile police killings.
But if even a type of parts was lacking, the established order continued. In Brazil, the Carandiru bloodbath was actually a scandal, and there was a reasonably sturdy political opposition that joined within the criticism, to some extent. But public opinion about it was fragmented: citing polls on the time, Gonzalez discovered that a couple of third of Brazilians authorised of the way in which that the police had dealt with the state of affairs. The second component of the sequence, convergence of public opinion, was lacking. The outcome: no reform.