Cold winter: How the EU may also help Moldova survive Russian stress and shield its democracy


  • Russia has lengthy used gasoline costs and provide to place stress on Moldova. It did so once more when the nation elected pro-European president Maia Sandu in 2020 and her parliamentary majority in 2021.
  • Moldova occupies a big geostrategic place with regard to the conflict in Ukraine, as a key ally and neighbour to that nation’s instant west.
  • The Moldovan authorities has made some progress on its reform agenda, all whereas coping with the impacts of the conflict, together with taking care of refugees and dealing with elevated transit of products throughout its territory.
  • If the federal government can get via this winter, in 2023 it ought to be capable to additional diversify its vitality choices and reinforce progress on reform of the judiciary, defence, and safety.
  • The EU ought to assist the Moldovan authorities in its endeavours. The nation stays extremely susceptible to Russian stress however monetary help within the brief time period and assist for reform in the long run will assist it make progress, together with in direction of eventual EU membership.


Moldova’s new reformist authorities got here to energy in August 2021 beneath President Maia Sandu, promising to wash up Moldova after years of corruption and deepen relations with the European Union. Since that point, it has confronted a succession of crises, all of that are linked to Russia. Within weeks of the brand new authorities taking workplace, Moscow hiked gasoline costs, forcing Chisinau to declare a state of emergency. From February 2022, Moldova then needed to put together for a possible direct safety risk to its territory as Russian forces in Ukraine superior in direction of Odesa, amid rumours of a second entrance opening up within the breakaway Moldovan area of Transnistria. And, by the tip of May, 471,000 Ukrainian refugees had entered the nation, the best per capita quantity in Europe; 87,700 Ukrainians have since stayed. The nation is battling 34 per cent inflation, and 63 per cent of Moldovans are deemed by the United Nations Development Programme to be in energy poverty.

Stoking unrest and creating problem for Moldova will at all times be a helpful tactic for Russia, which is nicely versed in producing destabilisation alternatives for itself throughout the previous Soviet Union and past. The direct navy risk from Russia has receded for now; however a second vitality disaster started when Russia diminished gasoline provides to Moldova by 30 per cent on 1 October 2022, then 40 per cent in November this yr. Chisinau has additionally struggled to diversify its electrical energy provide, which it traditionally sourced from Transnistria or Ukraine. Moreover, this yr Moscow-backed opposition forces have mounted protests calling for the federal government’s resignation, exploiting grievances over the economic system and vitality costs.

Moldova is under no circumstances out of the woods when it comes to its safety. Therefore, simply because the EU ought to undertake a ‘long war’ approach to the assist it provides Ukraine, so it ought to recognise Moldova’s pivotal location in that battle, alongside the nation’s more and more strong pro-European orientation. It ought to contemplate the right way to present long-term assist to safe Moldova’s place and strengthen its home establishments.

Indeed, regardless of the challenges of the final yr the Moldovan authorities retains important reform ambitions, and in June the EU granted Moldova candidate standing – one thing which might have been unlikely had been it not for Russia’s aggression. Reform in Moldova and the conflict in Ukraine are subsequently tightly intertwined, and European help in addressing these can even be carefully linked and mutually reinforcing.

Ever since taking workplace, the federal government has needed to function in a kind of survival mode, coping with its personal pro-Russian opposition and highly effective oligarchic networks, responding to covid-19, and now dealing with the results of conflict subsequent door. Exiting this survival mode will likely be all the simpler if the federal government may also make demonstrable progress past its authentic reform agenda. The EU and its member states ought to supply their assist to the Sandu authorities within the essential two years earlier than the subsequent presidential election, not just for Moldova’s personal profit however in assist of a steady and safe Europe extra broadly. This paper units out how European decision-makers can do that. Throughout, it attracts on interviews with political leaders and specialists in Moldova carried out by the creator in September 2022.

Reform in Moldova

Moldova’s first post-independence reform wave got here when the Alliance for European Integration changed the previous Communist Party in energy in 2009-10, solely to be hollowed out by native corruption networks. Two infamous monetary scandals subsequently rocked the nation. In 2014, $1 billion was siphoned out of three Moldovan banks (Banca de Economii, Unibank, and Banca Sociala), which on the time totalled round an eighth of nationwide GDP. Moldova was a key a part of the ‘laundromat’ scheme, whereby tens of billions of {dollars} disappeared offshore, principally originating from Russia. To this backdrop, Sandu has lengthy made the battle with corruption her focus. When she first ran, unsuccessfully, for the presidency in 2016 she set out a reform programme to sort out this. Following the arrival of the brand new authorities in August 2021, expectations for change had been subsequently excessive.

The principal beneficiaries of corruption in Moldova had been oligarchs who had lengthy dominated the nation’s governments. These included Vlad Plahotniuc, at the least till 2019 when his entrance party, the Democrats, failed to completely rig the parliamentary election. That yr, Sandu was briefly prime minister for 5 months however needed to type a short-lived coalition with the pro-Russian Socialist Party, which then allied with remnants of the previous regime to eject her from workplace. Sandu lastly triumphed with 57.7 per cent of the vote within the presidential election in November 2020, in opposition to 42.3 per cent for the incumbent, the Socialist Party chief Igor Dodon. Even then, Sandu needed to cohabit with the outgoing parliament, however she efficiently compelled an early election to interrupt this deadlock. In the July 2021 normal election, her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) received 52.8 per cent of the vote and 63 out of 101 seats. The Socialists received 27.2 per cent and 32 seats in alliance with the Communists. The Moscow-backed Shor Party – named after one other controversial oligarch concerned within the banking scandal, Ilan Shor – received 5.7 per cent and 6 seats.

Despite some observers labelling the occasions of 2009-10 the “Twitter Revolution”, Moldova has at all times had a gradualist method to reform. This is in distinction to, for instance, Ukraine with its Orange Revolution in 2004 and Revolution of Dignity in 2014, or Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003. Central to this method has been the dedication in Moldova to due course of. Reformers have prevented slicing corners when offering a authorized reckoning to figures from the previous regime. Oligarchs stored their property, together with media retailers. This was totally different to Ukraine’s securitised method earlier than the conflict started in February 2022, whereby President Volodymyr Zelensky pursued so-called ‘deoligarchisation’ by levelling treason fees and organising the programme although the National Security and Defence Council reasonably than via the courts.

Nevertheless, from 2021 onward, public opinion and pro-European impartial media turned impatient with the tempo of change: reform to entrenched post-communist vested pursuits was sluggish and tough. And the federal government discovered the chances stacked in opposition to it, with the outgoing regime retaining many inbuilt benefits, particularly management of the judiciary and quite a few media retailers. These remained key blocks. Since the beginning of Russia’s conflict on Ukraine, Moldova has made some progress in these areas. The conflict has additionally prompted a brand new deal with the nation’s defence and safety, however the authorities has appreciable work nonetheless to do in these domains too. Overall, the conflict has diluted its capability to enact reform.


Moldova’s judicial system was completely taken over and corrupted throughout the interval of oligarch-Socialist authorities. Unfortunately, Western recommendation about judicial independence has created what the nation’s overseas minister Nicu Popescu calls “excessive partitions for a hyper-corrupt system” – whereby judicial independence has made it tough to take away corrupt judges.[1] Still, lots of these accused of corruption took the brand new authorities’s intentions critically sufficient and fled Moldova. Plahotniuc had already left, in 2019, first for the United States, after which Turkey; Shor is in Israel; and Gheorghe Cavcaliuc, Plahotniuc’s man within the police, went to London. Dodon was positioned beneath home arrest in May 2022, on 4 fees together with corruption and treason, and was indicted on 7 October 2022.

Nevertheless, among the accused have been ready to make use of ‘pocket’ courts to win their freedom, endlessly delay proceedings, or in a specific native tactic often called a “merger of affairs” to change a case to a different court docket, in order that it has to start once more from scratch. The solely important determine in jail was Veaceslav Platon, who was launched to present proof in opposition to Plahotniuc; however he promptly fled the nation. In October 2022, the US accused Plahotniuc, Shor, and 7 others of “capturing and corrupting Moldova’s political and financial establishments” and “performing as devices of Russia’s international affect marketing campaign”.

To pace up progress on this, in April 2022 the Moldovan authorities started “pre-vetting” round 100 high judges and prosecutors within the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors. This course of was overseen by a six-person fee appointed by parliament, three of whom had been really useful by worldwide growth companions. Similar plans are in prepare to wash up the National Institute of Justice, which trains judges and prosecutors. The authorities aimed to start out on the high, with the intention to break up clan networks, with pre-vetting to be adopted by new elections in parliament to the Supreme Court of Justice. This method might be then prolonged to all judges. In addition, the chief prosecutor, Alexandr Stoianoglo, was arrested in October 2021 and changed by Dumitru Robu, partly as a result of he had beforehand launched Platon. An outsider, Veronica Dragalin, a US assistant lawyer of Moldovan origin, was made chief prosecutor of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in June 2022. Overall, judicial reform will take three to 5 years – a timeframe that doesn’t match the subsequent elections, so Moldova will need assistance to speed up.[2] 

Partiesand media

Moldova’s oligarchs started to lose affect after Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine. And indicators have emerged that the previous oligarchic media is a declining asset, with cash brief, homeowners overseas, and previous schemes based mostly on pumping cash from state companies, significantly for adverts, having ceased to function. That is to not say that the oligarchs’ affect is now utterly diminished. Reporters Without Borders this yr discovered that Moldovan media was nonetheless marked by “extreme affect by oligarchs. Major media, comparable to TV6, NTV Moldovaand Prime TV, are within the palms of political leaders”.[3] And two of the primary pro-Russian tv channels were transferred to an affiliate of Shor in September 2022, which hardly demonstrates a loosening of Russian affect.

Still, Prime TV has needed to lay off employees and its rankings are down. The Audiovisual Council, which for the reason that finish of 2021 has had new administration as a part of the Sandu authorities reforms, is now stricter about objectivity and stability within the media. Previously, oligarchic tv was keen on merely relaying on-line and social media as information, a lot of it pretend; now retailers have to fulfill increased requirements. These requirements have slowly improved, not least due to the difficulty of small fines, which brought on media homeowners to fret about dropping their licences. New impartial tv, comparable to Zhurnal and Pro TV, is energetic, even when it largely preaches to its already pro-European viewers. It produces little content material in Russian for native Russian audio system.

Oligarchic media and their “poisonous capabilities” have moved on-line, nonetheless, reasonably than disappearing from the scene; regulatory supervision of on-line output is virtually absent.[4] To shield their pursuits and undermine the brand new authorities, oligarchs have “began to put money into different politics, disinformation and media”.[5] Telegram and TikTookay have grow to be key channels for Russian and oligarchic disinformation, as have online influencers. Slick new pro-Russian platforms have additionally emerged, comparable to Morar News and Morar Life, arrange by a former frontline pro-European journalist who switched camps, full of pretend ‘specialists’ pedalling anti-Sandu traces.

Once Russia’s conflict on Ukraine started, a lot of the inhabitants, particularly Russian audio system, together with the Gagauz, continued to eat the remainder of Russian media, significantly on-line. One-quarter of the inhabitants in Moldova believed elements of the Russian conflict narrative, together with 26 per cent who backed the parable of a “particular navy operation,” whereas two-thirds agreed that Russia was at conflict with Ukraine. A smaller quantity, 15.2 per cent, backed the parable that Russia was “liberating Ukraine from fascism”. Russophile sentiments declined as the character of Russian aggression turned clear. It then picked up again with a certain quantity of conflict fatigue.

Moldova’s oligarchs nonetheless affect the Socialists and the Shor Party. They have additionally hedged their bets with new ‘political technology’ party tasks, comparable to Socialist mayor of Chisinau Ion Ceban’s National Alternative Movement, and former Socialist prime minister Ion Chicu’s Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova. In half this was as a result of, following the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Dodon’s pro-Russian model seemed tarnished. Now they solely allude to the supposed advantages of shut relations with Moscow.

Using their media platforms, opposition events criticise the president for not ‘negotiating’ with Russia – code for the financial dividends that Russia had beforehand given the Socialists, largely within the type of cheaper gasoline. They argue that the federal government’s reform programme will increase the burden on strange individuals. For a time, this helped shift the polls, in order that by spring 2022 the Socialist-Communist alliance was back in front. The Shor Party initially sought to reap profit by avoiding point out of the conflict altogether; however by the autumn it had shifted to a pro-Russian place, partly to poach Socialist-Communist voters. Overall, nonetheless, the conflict consolidated majority opinion. Support for EU membership rose from 52 per cent to 61 per cent by March 2022; and PAS has nudged again in entrance of the Socialists. The conflict has made it a lot tougher for the opposition to win again energy from an overtly pro-Russian place. 

Defence and safety

Moldova has solely minimal armed forces, comprising 6,500 troopers, regardless of some latest build-up via cooperation with Romania and the US. In phrases of reform, it’s nonetheless at the moment shifting in direction of the system utilized in Georgia when Mikheil Saakashvili was president, by which small elite forces gained expertise via participation in worldwide operations. This has some benefits when it comes to expertise and interoperability, together with with NATO states; nevertheless it is not going to contribute a lot to the safety of Moldova. Instead, even with its restricted personnel, the nation must rapidly construct out a system of territorial defence, drawing on all sectors of society to be able to mobilise in case of a risk. Moldova stays formally impartial, and the federal government has no intention of looking for to vary this.
The nation raised defence spending twice in 2022, by 18.3 per cent in complete, and the federal government devoted this elevated funding to modernising elements of its armed forces. Moldova was already engaged in an EU cyber defence programme earlier than the conflict started; the EU added €8m to the programme in May. Moldova additionally has precious entry to satellite tv for pc intelligence on the EU’s satellite tv for pc centre, SatCen.

According to the nation’s overseas minister, Moldova was in a position to improve assist for Ukraine solely slowly: “What we’ve executed when it comes to solidarity with Ukraine in six months we couldn’t have executed in six days.”[6] Moldovan society and establishments weren’t prepared: they had been as “unconsolidated as Ukraine’s had been in 2014”, Popescu says.[7]

After Russia’s conflict on Ukraine started, Moldova was confronted with an enormous improve in transit site visitors to and from Ukraine. Its border guard and customs administrations have solely restricted capability, and tools at crossing factors is insufficient. The small measurement of the nation implies that anybody or something crossing the jap border of Moldova can attain the western border with the EU in lower than two hours. Managing the circulate of products and folks throughout Moldova has grown massively in significance: Ukraine has rerouted sea exports from Odesa although Moldovan territory, together with grain by prepare. A rail hyperlink from southern Moldova to Galati in Romania opened in July, permitting transit to bypass Transnistria. Ukraine has vastly increased oil imports via Moldova, to compensate for Russian assaults on its refineries.

The Moldovan authorities additionally face a safety danger from unlawful migration (together with with the usage of solid Moldovan or Ukrainian paperwork), human trafficking, arms smuggling, and medicines trafficking. To deal with a lot of this, the work of the EU border help mission and the deployment of Frontex on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border have helped Moldova face the challenges ensuing from the conflict. Frontex deployed to Moldova for the primary time in March 2022, and in September expanded to a complete of 70 officers engaged on border surveillance and management and supporting the processing of refugees.

Building up its safety will at all times be tough for a small, impartial state comparable to Moldova. It can take care of restricted challenges, however not kinetic threats.

Russia’s conflict on Ukraine: Threats to Moldova

In the primary few weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there was an actual chance of the conflict reaching Moldova. Russian forces rising from Crimea made speedy progress in Ukraine’s south, threatening the Ukrainian cities of Mykolaiv and Odesa. This created the opportunity of a pincer motion along with Russian forces based mostly in Transnistria, both in direction of Odesa or into the remainder of Moldova. Moldova had barely any means to defend itself in opposition to such an onslaught.

The pace of Russia’s preliminary advance drove a disproportionate variety of Ukrainian refugees into Moldova – almost half a million people, principally ladies and kids. Moldova shares a 1,200km border with Ukraine, though it doesn’t management the 400km section between the Transnistrian area and Ukraine, which Kyiv closed on 28 February 2022. The Moldovan authorities’s restricted capability to assist these fleeing the battle meant that the associated fee primarily fell on society, which mobilised an enormous volunteer effort to accommodate 96 per cent of the refugees in personal houses and flats. Less seen was the variety of Moldovans who left to get additional away from the battle, particularly these with EU, primarily Romanian, passports.[8]

On Moscow’s orders, in late April the authorities in Transnistria declared mobilisation and a state of emergency. The navy drive current within the area contains three motorised battalions, one armoured battalion, and a few lately mobilised gentle infantry.[9] None of those is nicely educated and the Russian officers posted in Transnistria for the reason that native battle led to 1992 have embedded with native elites and corruption schemes. While Russia nonetheless offers safety to those elites, their essential curiosity is the pursuit of native entanglements in and between Transnistria and Moldova. There isn’t any assure of them or Russian forces there taking part in a helpful position for Russia in Moldova. Fears of imminent invasion or overspill into Moldova fell by April because the risk to Odesa dissipated.

Currently, traces of communication between Chisinau and Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria, stay open. The Moldovan authorities consider Transnistria is unlikely to instigate a navy motion by itself initiative, and Transnistria is simply as eager about its personal safety; it’s not merely Russia’s plaything.[10] Moreover, the efficient finish of commerce between Transnistria and Ukraine has made the breakaway area depending on provide via the remainder of Moldova, particularly when it comes to metal exports from Transnistria. One main affect of the conflict for Transnistria has been that its authorities have successfully agreed an off-the-cuff truce with Chisinau. One Moldovan observer describes how: “they [Transnistria] give us electrical energy and we give them licences for metal export [to the EU].”[11] This could additional discourage the Transnistrian authorities from getting dragged into Russia’s actions within the area.

On high of this, normal inflation in Moldova stands at 34 per cent, pushed up by shortages deriving from lack of commerce with Ukraine; solely 5 essential crossing factors are at the moment functioning in Moldova, all being with Romania. To assist residents, this yr the federal government provided one other short-term bundle (after that for covid-19) to assist with normal inflation and vitality prices, with top-ups for pensioners, individuals with month-to-month incomes beneath 15,000 lei, and authorities employees. Bills fell. But the entire bundle value 5 billion lei or €250m, which was an enormous sum for Moldova – the federal government used up a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development mortgage of €300m to fund it. The finances deficit now stands at 6 per cent of GDP, which is a most when it comes to the state’s future capacity to service curiosity funds. Internal borrowing is prohibitively costly, because the central financial institution has raised rates of interest to 18-19 per cent to attempt to comprise inflation.[12]

With one-third of Moldovans having to spend greater than half their earnings on vitality payments, the chance of social unrest is actual.[13] Demonstrations, real and orchestrated, via the summer time began up once more on 18 September, organised by the Shor Party. Senior officers from the party visited Moscow in September seeking political and media assist. Shortly afterwards, the demonstrations advanced right into a everlasting camp outdoors the presidential administration, that includes slogans comparable to “No to a Cold War, No to a Cold Winter”.

Moldova stays extremely susceptible. Still, Chisinau was ready to make use of the respiratory area in the summertime to implement some strategic safety measures. For instance, whereas the federal government initially felt the nation’s economic system was too weak for it to have the ability to undertake all sanctions in opposition to Russia, it imposed many in late April. It additionally banned Russian tv information from (re)broadcasting in Moldova, took poisonous Russian speak exhibits off the air, and blocked Also in April, the federal government prohibited the general public show of Russian St George ribbons and the ‘V’ and ‘Z’ symbols.

Paradoxically, the Moldovan authorities has to contemplate the opportunity of the Ukrainian military in some unspecified time in the future launching an offensive to take away Russian forces from Transnistria, whose presence obliges Kyiv to maintain troops on the border with Moldova. Ukraine may additionally transfer to grab the Cobasna ammunition depot in northern Transnistria, which is without doubt one of the largest in Europe. In such a state of affairs, Chisinau would face quite a lot of tough points, together with: the right way to reintegrate, administer, and police this territory; what to do with formally Moldovan residents who labored as proxies of Russia; and the right way to set up transitional justice. Given the polarisation between Moldovan events on the difficulty of the connection with Russia, these questions would bear important home political dangers.

Now, on the finish of 2022, Moldova has the chance for additional respiratory area. It ought to use this time to plan its continued reforms to strengthen its establishments, its safety, and the place attainable its defence capabilities.

Above all, it wants to handle its essential Achilles heel with regard to Russia: vitality dependence.

Energy and Russia

Prior to February 2022, Moldova was no exception to Russia’s pursuit of ratcheting up tensions with Ukraine and Europe extra broadly. Russia has lengthy leveraged Moldova’s vitality dependence to extract concessions on safety and nationwide sovereignty. In the run-up to the 2021 Moldovan elections, Moscow had left the previous authorities on a short-term vitality contract: if a party pleasant to it got here to energy, it will renew the deal. Instead, it immediately examined the brand new authorities with its hike in gasoline costs. At the identical time, Russia additionally pressed for navy ‘cooperation’ with Moldova and sought to trilateralise Moldova’s bilateral commerce relations with the EU, calling for its affiliation settlement to be reopened and renegotiated. Even with the Socialist authorities in 2020, Moscow linked a $250m Russian mortgage to concessions to permit Russian companies to take part in state procurement and to nationalising personal debt, though Moldova’s constitutional court docket struck that association down.

In October 2021, with the nation’s gasoline provide contract simply weeks from working out, Russia demanded a value of $790 per thousand cubic metres, up from $550, whereas it minimize provide by one-third. The Moldovan authorities introduced a 30-day state of emergency and, in haste, signed a brand new five-year contract. In return for a decrease preliminary value of $450 per thousand cubic metres, it agreed to a formulation by which 30 per cent of the brand new gasoline value in winter (from 1 October to 1 April) can be based mostly on gasoline spot market costs, with the remaining 70 per cent based mostly on the oil market value. But spot market costs had been excessive and rising, and far larger than Moldova’s earlier funds. In the summer time months, the formulation reversed to 70 per cent gasoline value and 30 per cent oil value, which gave the Moldovan authorities solely short-term reduction. With gasoline costs hovering, Moldova was truly paying extra within the hotter months, as much as a peak of $1,883 by September 2022; family gasoline funds had gone up 250 per cent.

The reformist authorities had planned to unbundle the vitality provide chain in Moldova as a part of its implementation of the EU’s third vitality bundle. This threatened the native monopoly of Moldovagaz, which is 50 per cent owned by Russia’s Gazprom and 13.4 per cent owned by Transnistria; the Chisinau authorities owns 35.3 per cent. The Moldovan authorities had additionally promised to audit Gazprom’s declare that they owed it $709m, $300m of which was penalties. But it has delayed the unbundling, and postponed the audit, first to 1 May 2022, later prolonged to 1 October 2022, and now March 2023. It has, nonetheless, appointed two Western firms, in Norway and the United Kingdom, to conduct the audit. Moldovagaz has additionally dragged its heels, due to what an audit may reveal about its mismanagement and graft.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, with the choice of navy stress on Moldova now not accessible to it following its stalled advance within the south, vitality turned a pure weapon of dependence for Moscow. And, regardless of its cautious method, Chisinau was a significant strategic ally for Kyiv. According to Dumitru Alaiba of the parliamentary fee on finances and funds, “we all know what to anticipate from Russia, as we’re essentially the most energy-dependent [former Soviet] nation.”[14] Russia had the excuse: Moldova had struggled to fulfill its month-to-month funds to Gazprom. On 1 October 2022, Russia reduced gasoline provides to Moldova by 30 per cent. The value stood at $1,028 and the Moldovan authorities was compelled to raise domestic tariffs but once more, this time by 27 per cent.

The possibility remained – and stays – for Russia to halt gasoline provides to Moldova utterly, though it faces a big constraint on this: it will be unable to chop off Moldova on the suitable financial institution of the river Nistru with out additionally slicing off Transnistria on the left financial institution. Still, Moldovans face the prospect of a chilly winter, and their authorities is already struggling to pay crippling vitality payments. The EU’s latest announcement of €250m in assist, in addition to additional finance from the EBRD, ought to make a distinction within the coming months.

Resolving Moldova’s vitality troubles

To survive the winter, Moldova must make progress on three elements of its vitality provide: alternate options, availability, and affordability.

In phrases of alternate options, historically the whole thing of Moldova’s gasoline provide comes from Gazprom – however three different pipelines can be found for potential interconnection. In 2021 the federal government had already experimented with utilizing the largest of those, at Oleksiivka simply over the border in western Ukraine. It efficiently imported 1 million cubic metres of gasoline from Poland via the connection. This high-capacity route may doubtlessly cowl all of Moldova’s wants. The second different contains the pipeline from Iasi in Romania to Ungheni to Chisinau, which was formally accomplished in October 2021. This may meet 30 per cent of Moldova’s wants, though principally within the Chisinau metropolitan space. The third possibility is doubtlessly essentially the most promising: gasoline from Turkey and Azerbaijan can now attain Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor and the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria hyperlink. And the Trans-Balkan Pipeline may transport this gasoline additional north. Moldova stays in negotiations with Azerbaijan to safe additional provide.

Moldova has different potential allies in its seek for alternate options. Its shut accomplice Romania is rising as an vitality hub for jap and southern Europe; it’s ramping up offshore gasoline manufacturing within the Black Sea via ventures comparable to its Neptun Deep drilling mission. To assist this, Bucharest launched a extra beneficial vitality tax regime in summer time 2022. Neptun Deep ought to grow to be totally operational in 2026. Romania may additionally exploit pure gasoline deposits within the Carpathian Mountains. In 2022, Moldova organized for 2 weeks’ value of gasoline reserves to enter Romanian storage. There was even the opportunity of Moldovan participation in Romania’s buy of small modular nuclear reactors from the US. The US may additionally contribute to provides of liquefied pure gasoline (LNG).

Moldova’s second problem is availability, on condition that the remainder of Europe can also be attempting to supply additional gasoline, to construct storage for the winter and diversify away from Russian gasoline. Recent good progress on storage and on LNG imports ought to make extra gasoline accessible. But the ultimate and largest drawback for Moldova is affordability. Any buy of gasoline on the open market is at a vastly increased value than Moldova has been used to.

The Moldovan authorities has used 2022 to organize measures to assist the nation via a doubtlessly tough winter. These included buying mazut, an inexpensive residue oil, for many buildings in Chisinau on central heating, and supplying wooden and coal to the countryside. Universities deliberate for a protracted Christmas closure.

But the federal government’s place with Transnistria might be storing up problems for the longer term. In the previous, the area obtained its gasoline from Russia without cost; or, reasonably, the debt was loaded on to the Moldovan authorities. If within the close to future Chisinau succeeds in shopping for gasoline for the entire of Moldova from sources apart from Russia, then Sandu has stated that Transnistria would be expected to pay its share. This will threaten the uneasy equilibrium established between Chisinau and Transnistria amid the conflict.

Still, if the federal government can get via the winter, it would profit from work it has already executed to quietly take away “all of the authorized obstacles to unbundling” the gasoline sector.[15] Despite the challenges to reform, Moldovagaz is turning into extra clear and open to regulation. This may assist fight the corporate’s many illegal practices – and make it tough for Gazprom to proceed to make use of the corporate to put political stress on the Moldovan authorities. Alaiba even claimed confidently that “subsequent yr will probably be goodbye to Gazprom”.[16]


Similar, if not larger issues, apply to Moldova’s electrical energy necessities. Traditionally, Moldova produces solely 25-30 per cent of its personal wants and would usually purchase 70 per cent of the remainder from the Cuciurgan energy plant in Transnistria (sadly additionally produced with Russian gasoline). The remaining 30 per cent got here from Ukraine. Moldova has bought extra from Ukraine prior to now, however Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear complicated, which Ukraine depends on for one-quarter of its personal electrical energy, and assaults on that nation’s energy provide imply that is now not an possibility. Ukrainian electrical energy can also be at the moment 4 occasions costlier than the Cuciurgan value, as a result of Transnistria’s gasoline invoice is handed on to Moldova’s state debt.[17] Moldova has made much less progress in direction of diversifying its electrical energy than it has with gasoline. A mission backed by the World Bank to construct a excessive voltage electrical energy line to Romania is three years from completion.


Moldova’s authorities is dealing with challenges larger than any of its predecessors. Moldova isn’t solely a collateral sufferer of the conflict in Ukraine; Russia’s vitality leverage is clearly a part of its hybrid conflict in opposition to extra than simply Ukraine. But the Moldovan authorities continues to be looking for to implement its authentic agenda, and the tough geostrategic context solely offers larger motive for it to take action. As overseas ministry senior adviser Stela Leuca put it, “a giant portion of how we function is survival mode, however that doesn’t take away from our strategic, reform dedication”.[18] The authorities has to deal with safety, handle a number of crises, mitigate the social and financial affect on residents, make progress on turning into a member of the EU, degree the taking part in area with the opposition via media and judicial reform, and ship on its authentic programme of justice and anti-corruption.

Moldova beneath the Sandu authorities in 2022 endured a scorching spring and a cooler summer time; now it faces a chilly winter. But if it may well proceed to pay for the gasoline it must get via to subsequent spring, the reforms the federal government has managed to enact up to now – on corruption, on the media, and on vitality – imply that it may have some important political respiratory area in 2023. PAS controls the manager and legislature, however the judiciary stays captured by oligarchic influences. Still, there are two years earlier than nationwide elections are due (though native elections are scheduled for 2023) and the federal government has a steady majority.

The authorities wants worldwide assist to assist it ship as many reforms as attainable by the elections in 2025. There are two dimensions to the vitality disaster in Moldova: the worldwide one (dependence on Russian gasoline and Transnistrian electrical energy, which is kind of the identical drawback) and the home one (the social penalties and potential destabilising impact). The EU wants to contemplate each short-term actions – monetary help to assist Moldova buy gasoline on worldwide markets if wanted – and long-term actions, rushing up interconnection with EU vitality networks, in addition to supporting renewable energies and rising vitality effectivity within the nation. Moldova’s vitality provide diversification will speed up: its trajectory is such that there’s now no going again on this. But the federal government and European donors want take steps to progress this as rapidly as attainable. Otherwise, Moldova will maintain utilizing assets on short-term options with out investing in long-term ones that might improve its vitality independence and resilience. Without monetary assist to make up the vitality provide shortfall, this may stay a weak spot for Russia to press: an unstable Moldova may have an effect on Ukraine, had been Russia to aim to create new fronts to alleviate the stress of the counter-offensive it’s dealing with in jap Ukraine, or at some other future stage within the conflict, which is ready to proceed for some years.

In phrases of its defence and safety, Moldova wants to change method and construct a constant system of territorial defence, with an environment friendly reserve system in addition to common coaching. To help on this effort, the EU ought to supply assistance on officer and NCO coaching modernisation, and it ought to prolong its training mission for Ukraine to Moldova. In the present context, the EU must also contemplate establishing a “security compact” with Moldova, beneath which it may well present safety help in a variety of areas together with intelligence, cyber safety, and defence capabilities.  

With regard to the EU integration process, Moldova wants pressing assist from the EU to increase its institutional capacities to deal with the onerous technical integration course of. The EU additionally wants to assist Moldova grow to be a profitable instance of its closely criticised enlargement coverage. To obtain this, it wants to extend cooperation with Moldova in key areas and assist it obtain quicker progress on reforms. As one latest ECFR publication really useful, that is attainable if Moldova and different EU candidate nations profit from elevated monetary help on vitality and infrastructure tasks, integration into the only market, and stronger cooperation on safety and defence.  

The EU may also do extra to assist Moldova to handle its borders successfully. It can present capability constructing for the customs service and the border guard.

Finally, EU member states ought to draw classes from the way in which that the Moldovan authorities have up to now managed this disaster. They have navigated a approach via with solely restricted capacities, and mixed a deep sense of humanitarian accountability with a pointy understanding of the safety challenges they’ve needed to take care of. The will to reform is there; Moldova’s European mates ought to guarantee it additionally possesses the means.

About the creator

Andrew Wilson is a professor of Ukrainian research at UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies.


Thanks go to Adam Harrison for modifying this coverage temporary and to Tefta Kelmendi for organising the go to to Moldova.

[1] Face to face ECFR interview with Nicu Popescu, Chisinau, 13 September 2022.

[2] Face to face ECFR interview with Iulian Groza, Chisinau, 15 September 2022.

[3] Face to face ECFR interview with Valeriu Pasa, Chisinau, 16 September 2022.

[4] Face to face, ECFR interview with Valeriu Pasa, Chisinau, 16 September 2022.

[5] Face to face, ECFR interview with Valeriu Pasa, Chisinau, 16 September 2022.

[6] Face to face ECFR interview with Nicu Popescu, Chisinau, 13 September 2022.

[7] Face to face ECFR interview with Nicu Popescu, Chisinau, 13 September 2022.

[8] Face to face ECFR interview with Stela Leuca, Chisinau, 15 September 2022.

[9] Face to face ECFR interview with Moldovan Ministry for Reintegration officers, Chisinau, 3 October 2022, and Moldovan Ministry of Defence officers, Chisinau, 4 October 2022.

[10] ECFR interview with Moldovan authorities officers, Chisinau, October 2022.

[11] Face to face ECFR interview with Iulian Groza, Chisinau, 15 September 2022.

[12] Face to face ECFR interview with Dumitru Alaiba, Chisinau, 16 September 2022.

[13] Face to face ECFR interview with Dumitru Alaiba, Chisinau, 16 September 2022.

[14] Face to face ECFR interview with Dumitru Alaiba, Chisinau, 16 September 2022.

[15] Face to face ECFR interview with Dumitru Alaiba, Chisinau, 16 September 2022.

[16] Face to face ECFR interview with Dumitru Alaiba, Chisinau, 16 September 2022.

[17] Face to face ECFR interview with Iulian Groza, Chisinau, 15 September 2022.

[18] Face to face ECFR interview with Stela Leuca, Chisinau, 15 September 2022.

The European Council on Foreign Relations doesn’t take collective positions. ECFR publications solely signify the views of their particular person authors.



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